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Abstract
In the context of cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree prob-
lems, we introduce a property called No Advantageous Merging. This
property implies that no group of agents can be better o⁄ claiming
to be a single node. We show that the sharing rule that assigns to
each agent his own connection cost (the Bird rule) satis￿es this prop-
erty. Moreover, we provide a characterization of the Bird rule using
No Advantageous Merging.
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11 Introduction
Minimum cost spanning tree problems (mcstp) modelize situations where a
group of agents, located at di⁄erent geographical points, want some partic-
ular service which can only be provided by a common supplier, or source.
There are many economic situations that can be modeled in this way, for
instance, some houses in a village may want to be connected to a common
water source or to a power plant. Other examples include communication
networks such as Internet, cable television or telephone.
The agents will be served through connections which entail some cost.
However, the agents are not concerned with whether they are connected
directly or indirectly to the source.
Hence, the optimal network is a minimum (cost spanning) tree (mt). An
algorithm for building an mt is provided by Prim (1957). But building an
mt is only a part of the problem. Another important issue is how to divide
the cost associated with the mt between the agents. Di⁄erent rules give
di⁄erent answers to this question. A rule is a mapping that determines, for
each speci￿c problem, a division of the amount to be paid by the agents
involved in the problem.
Bird (1976) associated a coalitional game with any mcstp. In case the
mcstp has a unique mt, he proposed a rule that is known as the Bird rule.
Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984) studied the core and the nucleolus of the
coalitional game. Sharkey (1995) surveyed most of the literature. Recently,
Kar (2002) studied the Shapley value of the game that can be associated with
each mcstp. Dutta and Kar (2004) proposed a new rule and characterized
the Bird rule using a property of restricted consistency. Bergantiæos and
Vidal-Puga (2004a) de￿ned another rule, ’.
Feltkamp et al. (1994) introduced a rule for mcstp called Equal Remaining
Obligations rule. This rule has been studied in other papers. Branzei et al.
(2004) obtained a characterization of the Equal Remaining Obligations rule
and Bergantiæos and Vidal-Puga (2004b) proved that ’ coincides with the
Equal Remaining Obligations rule. Moreover, Bergantiæos and Vidal-Puga
2(2006) proved that ’ is the Shapley value of a di⁄erent coalitional game.
More recently, Tijs et al. (2004) de￿ned a class of rules called Obligation
Rules. Moretti et al. (2005) studied this class of rules.
Di⁄erent rules are usually associated with alternative sets of properties
that represent ethical or operational principles. The aim of the axiomatic
approach is, precisely, to identify each rule with a well-de￿ned set of prop-
erties. This helps to understand the nature of the di⁄erent rules and their
applicability. It is therefore important to have alternative characterizations
of the same rule, because this allows to have di⁄erent insights on the princi-
ples underlying the rule and on the type of problems for which it might be
suitable.
In this paper, we focus on a new property called No Advantageous Merging
(NAM). The idea behind this property that there exists a planner who wants
to construct a network to connect all the agents to a source. In this kind of
situations some agents may have incentives to join in advance in order to be
treated as a single agent and get advantage. A rule satis￿es No Advantageous
Merging if the agents have no incentives to do this.
In the general domain of the mcstp, No Advantageous Merging is in-
compatible with Symmetry. This implies that we should restrict the domain.
However, this new domain does not need to be very restrictive. In particular,
in case each mcstp has a unique mt, the Bird rule satis￿es No Advantageous
Merging. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the Bird
rule using No Advantageous Merging.
This property is related to others that have been studied in di⁄erent prob-
lems. For instance, a bankruptcy problem describes a situation in which an
arbitrator has to allocate a given amount among a group of agents who have
claims on it. A property known as No Advantageous Merging has been stud-
ied in this framework. This property means that no group of creditors have
incentives to pool their claims and to present themselves as a single creditor.
We can ￿nd a similar example in Social Choice, where group-strategyproofness
ensures that no subset of agents can gain by reporting false preferences. All
3these properties have in common that they pretend to avoid agents cheating
in order to get advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we show by an example
that No Advantageous Merging is a very strong property in the most general
framework. We hence have to restrict ourselves to a smaller class of mcstp.
In Section 3 we introduce the model. In Section 4 we present the properties
used in the characterization. In Section 5 we prove that the Bird rule satis￿es
these properties and we also present the characterization result. In Section
6 we prove that the properties are independent.
2 An example
Example 2.1 There are three agents, 1;2 and 3.The connection cost between
each agent and the source is 28. The connection cost between agents 1 and 2
and between agents 1 and 3 is 16. The connection cost between agents 2 and
3 is 8.
This problem is represented in the following ￿gure:
2
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0
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28
28
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where 0 is the source.
The minimum connection cost is 52 (there exist more than one possible
minimum tree).
Let xi be the assignment that a rule proposes to each agent i.
Suppose now that the agents in f2;3g join and act as a single one. The
resulting problem can be represented as follows:
40
{2,3} 1
28 28
16
By a symmetry argument, the allocation in this problem should be (22;22).
Moreover, since the cost of connection between agents 2 and 3 is 8, under No
Advantageous Merging the rule should assign them no more than 30, i.e.
x2 + x3 ￿ 22 + 8.
Proceeding in the same way with coalitions f1;2g and f1;3g, we obtain
x1 +x2 ￿ 18+16 and x1 +x3 ￿ 18+16: However, the minimum connection
cost is 52; hence we have an incompatibility.
It may be argued that this is a special example, because there are more
than one possible minimum tree. In the literature of mcstp it is usual to
consider that there exists a unique minimum tree, or even that there are not
two arcs with the same cost (see, for instance, Bird (1976) and Dutta and
Kar (2004)). We study what happens in this situation.
Example 2.2 There are three agents, 1;2 and 3: The connection costs be-
tween the source and agent 1 is 90; between the source and agent 2 is 72 and
between the source and agent 3 is 84. The connection cost between agents 1
and 2 is 18, between agents 1 and 3 is 12 and between agents 2 and 3 is 24.
This problem is represented in the following ￿gure:
52
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where 0 is the source.
We study the assignment proposed by several rules in the literature. These
are given in the following table:
1 2 3
Shapley value (Kar, 2002) 37 28 37
Bird (1976) 18 72 12
Dutta and Kar (2004) 12 18 72
Nucleolus (Granot and Huberman, 1984) 32 32 38
Bergantiæos and Vidal-Puga (2004a) 33 36 33
Assume now that the agents in f2;3g join and act as a single one. The
resulting problem can be represented as follows:
0
{2,3} 1
90 72
12
6In this case, the proposal given by each of the previous rules is:
1 f2;3g
Shapley value (Kar, 2002) 51 33
Bird (1976) 12 72
Dutta and Kar (2004) 72 12
Nucleolus (Granot and Huberman, 1984) 51 33
Bergantiæos and Vidal-Puga (2004a) 42 42
The question is: Do these rules satisfy No Advantageous Merging? If we
compare the costs that agents 2 and 3 have to pay in both situations, we have
Shapley value (Kar, 2002) 28 + 37 > 33 + 24
Bird (1976) 72+12<72+24
Dutta and Kar(2004) 18 + 72 > 12 + 24
Nucleolus (Granot and Huberman, 1984) 32 + 38 > 33 + 24
Bergantiæos and Vidal-Puga (2004a) 36 + 33 > 42 + 24
Hence, in this example, only the rule de￿ned by Bird (1976) satis￿es No
Advantageous Merging. We will prove that this result holds in general.
3 The model
Given a ￿nite set A; we denote the cardinal set of A as 2A, the cardinality
of A as jAj and the set of real jAj-tuples whose indices are the elements of A
as RA. Given a function f : A ! R, we denote the set of elements in A that
maximize f as argmaxa2Aff(a)g. We de￿ne argmina2Aff(a)g analogously.
Let N be a ￿nite set of agents who want to be connected to a source.
Usually, we denote the set of agents as N = f1;2;:::ng. Let N0 = N [ f0g,
where 0 is the source.
A cost matrix on N0; C = (cij)i;j2N0 represents the cost of direct link
between any pair of nodes. We assume that cij = cji ￿ 0 for each i;j 2 N0,
and cii = 0 for each i 2 N0:
7We denote the set of all cost matrices on N as CN: Given two matrices
C;C0 2 CN, we say C ￿ C0 if cij ￿ c0
ij for all i;j 2 N0.
A minimum cost spanning tree problem, brie￿ y mcstp, is a pair (N0;C)
where N is the set of agents, 0 is the source, and C 2 CN.
A network g over N0 is a subset of f(i;j) : i;j 2 N0g: The elements of g
are called arcs. We assume that the arcs are undirected, i.e. (i;j) and (j;i)
represent the same arc.
Given a network g and a pair of nodes i and j, a path from i to j in g
is a sequence of di⁄erent arcs f(ih￿1;ih)gl
h=1 satisfying (ih￿1;ih) 2 g for all
h 2 f1;2;:::;lg, i = i0 and j = il:
A tree over S ￿ N0 is a network satisfying that for all i;j 2 S there exists
a unique path from i to j.
Given a network g; we say that two nodes i;j are connected in g if there
exists a path from i to j in g:
Let GN denote the set of all networks over N0. Let GN
0 denote the set of
all networks over N0 such that every node in N is connected to the source.
Let T N
0 denote the set of all trees over N0. Clearly, T N
0 ￿ GN
0 ￿ GN:
Given g 2 GN, we de￿ne the cost associated with g in (N0;C) as
c(N0;C;g) =
X
(i;j)2g
cij:
When no ambiguity, we write c(g) or c(C;g) instead of c(N0;C;g).
A minimum (cost spanning) tree for (N0;C), brie￿ y an mt, is a tree
t 2 T N
0 such that c(t) = ming2GN
0 c(g). Given an mcstp (N0;C), an mt always
exists but it does not need to be unique. We denote the cost associated with
any mt on (N0;C) as m(N0;C).
Given S ￿ N0, let CS denote the matrix C restricted to S. We denote the
restriction to S of the mcstp (N0;C) as (S;CS), and the cost associated with
any mt on (S;CS) as m(S;CS), that is, m(S;CS) is the cost of connection
of the agents of S among themselves. Note that when 0 62 S; m(S;CS) does
not include the cost of connection to the source.
Given a tree t, we de￿ne the predecessor set of a node i in t as P(i;t) =
8fj 2 N0 : j is in the unique path from i to the sourceg. We assume that
i 62 P(i;t) and 0 2 P(i;t) when i 6= 0. For notational convenience, P(0;t) =
;. The geodesic distance from node i to the source in t is the cardinality of
P(i;t): The immediate predecessor of agent i in t, denoted as i0; is the node
that comes immediately before i; that is, i0 2 P(i;t) and k 2 P(i;t) implies
either k = i0 or k 2 P(i0;t): Note that P(i0;t) ￿ P(i;t) and P(i;t)nP(i0;t) =
fi0g: The follower set of an agent i in t is the set F(i;t) = fj 2 N : i 2
P(j;t)g. The immediate followers of agent i in t, denoted as IF(i;t), is the
set of agents that come immediately after agent i, that is, IF(i;t) = fj 2
F(i;t) : j0 = ig:
Let ￿N denote the set of all orders in N. Given ￿ 2 ￿N; let P ￿
i denote
the set of elements in N which come before i in the order given by ￿, i:e:
P
￿
i := fj 2 N : ￿(j) < ￿(i)g:
There are several algorithms in the literature to construct an mt. Prim
(1957) provides such an algorithm: Sequentially, the agents connect to the
source. At each stage, the cheapest arc between the connected and the un-
connected agents is added. Formally, Prim￿ s algorithm is de￿ned as follows:
Let S0
g = f0g and g0 = ;.
Stage 1: Take an arc (0;i) such that c0i = min
j2N
fc0jg. Now, S1
g = f0;ig
and g1 = f(0;i)g.
Stage p: Assume we have de￿ned Sp￿1
g ￿ N0 and gp￿1 2 GN. We now
de￿ne Sp
g and gp. Take an arc (i;j); i 2 Sp￿1
g ; j 2 N0nSp￿1
g , such that
cij = min
k2S
p￿1
g ;l2N0nS
p￿1
g
fcklg. Now Sp
g = Sp￿1
g [ fig and gp = gp￿1 [ f(i;j)g.
This process ￿nishes in n stages. We say that gn is a tree obtained via
Prim￿ s algorithm.
This algorithm provides an mt, but not necessarily unique (when the
minimizer arc is not unique). Moreover, each mt can be obtained via Prim￿ s
algorithm.
A (cost allocation) rule is a function ￿ that assigns to each mcstp (N0;C)
a vector ￿(N0;C) 2 RN such that
P
i2N ￿i(N0;C) = m(N0;C), where
9￿i(N0;C) represents the cost assigned to agent i.
Notice that we implicitly assume that the agents build an mt.
Bird (1976) introduced a rule which is de￿ned through Prim￿ s algorithm.
He assumed that there is a unique mt.
Given an mcstp (N0;C) and an mt t = f(i0;i)gi2N in (N0;C), the Bird
rule (B) is de￿ned as:
B
t
i(N0;C) = ci0i
for each i 2 N.
The idea of the Bird rule is quite simple: The agents connect to the source
following Prim￿ s algorithm and each agent pays the cost of his connection.
Finally, we de￿ne a concept introduced by Norde et al. (2004) that will
be used in some of the proofs.
Given S ￿ N0, we say that i;j 2 S, i 6= j are (C;S)-connected if there
exists a path g from i to j satisfying that ckl = 0 for all (k;l) 2 g.
We say that S ￿ N0 is a C-component if two conditions hold: First, for
all i;j 2 S; i and j are (C;S)-connected. Second, S is maximal, i:e: if S ( T;
there exist i;j 2 T; i 6= j such that i and j are not (C;T)-connected.
The set of C-components constitutes a partition of N0:
4 Properties
Before introducing the properties of the rules, we de￿ne the domain restric-
tion on the set of permissible cost matrices that will be used. This restriction
is necessary because of the incompatibility presented in Section 2.
De￿nition 4.1 D := fC 2 CN : no two edges with positive cost have the
same valueg:
Remark 4.1 Dutta and Kar (2004) de￿ne two di⁄erent domain restrictions.
These de￿nitions are the following:
C1 := fC 2 CN : C induces a unique mt for all Ng;
C2 := fC 2 C1 : no two edges of the unique mt have the same cost}.
10Recall that Bird (1976) de￿nes the Bird rule when there is a unique mt.
Over D, there might exist several mt. In the next Proposition, we prove that
even though this is true, the Bird rule￿ s assignment is the same for all of
them.
Proposition 4.1 Let C 2 D and let t;t0 be two di⁄erent mt on (N0;C).
Then, Bt
i(N0;C) = Bt0
i (N0;C) for all i 2 N.
Proof. We will construct t and t0 following Prim￿ s algorithm.
Since C 2 D, both trees will have the same arcs until one agent connects
to the source with null cost. In that case, more than one arc with the same
cost may exist. Assume that it happens in stage p: Hence, tp￿1 = t0p￿1 and
S
p￿1
t = S
p￿1
t0 . By de￿nition of the Bird rule, Bt
i(N0;C) = Bt0
i (N0;C) for all
i 2 S
p￿1
t = S
p￿1
t0 :
Since we have found an arc with null cost, we have a non-trivial C-
component, say S ￿ N0. Since all the agents in S, but the ￿rst one, con-
nect with null cost, whatever the order of connection of the agents from
the C-component, each of them should pay zero under t and t0. Hence
Bt
i(N0;C) = Bt0
i (N0;C) for all i 2 S.
When all the agents in S are connected to the source, the following arc
that connects to the source, if any, will have positive cost. Hence, the domain
D requires that the arcs formed in both trees, t and t0 will be the same again
until a new C-component appears.
The procedure for the rest of the C-components is analogous because all
the agents in the C-component (but the ￿rst one) connect with null cost, and
they pay zero.
We now introduce di⁄erent properties of the rules.
De￿nition 4.2 A rule ￿ satis￿es Core Selection (CS) if for all mcstp (N0;C)
and all S ￿ N;
P
i2S
￿i(N0;C) ￿ m(S0;CS0):
This property says that no group of agents can be better o⁄constructing
their own network instead of paying what the rule ￿ proposes to them.
11Before moving on to the next property, we introduce the concept of an
extreme null point.
De￿nition 4.3 Given an mcstp (N0;C) and an mt t in (N0;C), we say that
i 2 N is an extreme point in t if F(i;t) = ;.
De￿nition 4.4 Given an mcstp (N0;C) we say that i 2 N is an Extreme
Null Point (ENP) if it is an extreme point in all the mt in (N0;C) and
moreover ci0i = 0.
Dutta and Kar (2004) de￿ned the concept of extreme point. They argued
that since node i is an extreme point, this node is of no use to the rest of the
network since no node is connected to the source through node i.
We argue the same for every extreme null point. Moreover, since i con-
nects to the source with null cost, it does not increase the total cost of the
network. Hence, we can consider that node i is not bene￿cial for the rest
of agents but neither is a problem for them. So, it seems reasonable that
the allocation of the rest of the agents does not change if he connects to the
source.
The property that we de￿ne states that if agent i is an ENP, no agent j
will pay a di⁄erent cost in order to include agent i in the network. Formally:
De￿nition 4.5 A rule ￿ satis￿es Independence of Extreme Null Points
(IENP) if for all mcstp (N0;C) and all ENP i 2 N,
￿j(N0nfig;CN0nfig) = ￿j(N0;C)
for all j 2 Nnfig.
This property implies that each ENP pays zero.
Remark 4.2 This property is similar to the one de￿ned by Derks and Haller
(1999) called ￿Null Player Out￿ , which requires that a null player (that is,
an individual whose contribution to any coalition is zero) does not in￿uence
the utility allocation within the rest of the society1.
1Hamiache (2006) uses the term "Independence of Irrelevant Players".
12We next consider the possibility that a group of agents A ￿ N joins in
advance to be treated as a single node ￿ 2 A.
The result is a new problem, called reduced problem, where the cost of
connection between some node i in N0nA and ￿ is the minimal connection
cost between node i and the agents in A. The rest of the costs remain as in
the initial problem. Formally,
De￿nition 4.6 Given an mcstp (N0;C) and ￿ 2 A ￿ N, the reduced
problem (NA￿
0 ;CA￿) is de￿ned as NA￿ = (NnA) [ f￿g, cA￿
ij = cij for all
i;j 2 N0nA; and cA￿
i￿ = min
j2A
fcijg for all i 2 N0nA:
We introduce a new property in mcstp:
De￿nition 4.7 Given C 2 D a rule ￿ satis￿es No Advantageous Merging
(NAM) if
X
i2A
￿i(N0;C) ￿ ￿￿(N
A￿
0 ;C
A￿) + m(A;CA)
for all ￿ 2 A ￿ N.
This property asserts that no group of agents might have any incentive
to join in advance, assuming the cost, to be treated as a single agent.
In the next proposition we state that in the reduced problem the matrix
CA￿ is well-de￿ned over D.
Proposition 4.2 If C2 D, then CA￿ 2 D for all ￿ 2 A ￿ N.
The proof is straightforward and we omit it.
5 The main result
In this section we present a characterization of the Bird rule in D. It is the
only rule satisfying CS, IENP and NAM. First, in Proposition 5.1, we prove
that the Bird rule satis￿es the mentioned properties.
13Proposition 5.1 Over the domain D, the Bird rule satis￿es CS, IENP and
NAM.
Proof. B satis￿es CS. See Bird (1976, page 340).
B satis￿es IENP. It is straightforward.
B satis￿es NAM:
Let t = f(i0;i)gi2N be an mt in the problem (N0;C). Let ￿ 2 A ￿ N.
Consider now (A;CA) and let ￿ be an mt in (A;CA), i.e. c(￿) = m(A;CA).
Let i￿ be the ￿rst agent in A that connects to the source following Prim￿ s
algorithm in t (i:e: S
p
t \ A = fi￿g and S
p￿1
t \ A = ;). Note that i￿0 2 N0nA.
Given t, we construct a new network in the problem (N0;C). Let
t
￿ = (tnf(i
0;i)gi2A) [ f(i
￿0;i
￿)g [ ￿:
It is straightforward to check that t￿ is a tree in (N0;C):
Since t is an mt in this problem, we have that c(t) ￿ c(t￿). Hence,
c(t) ￿ c(t) ￿
X
i2A
ci0i + ci￿0i￿ + c(￿)
that is,
X
i2A
ci0i ￿ ci￿0i￿ + c(￿) = ci￿0i￿ + m(A;CA):
Since i￿ is the ￿rst agent in A to be connected, ci￿0i￿ = min
j2A
fci￿0jg = cA￿
i￿0￿.
Hence, we can rewrite the above expression as:
X
i2A
ci0i ￿ c
A￿
i￿0￿ + m(A;CA):
It is clear that, following Prim￿ s algorithm, we can construct an mt t0 in
(NA￿
0 ;CA￿) such that (i￿0;￿) 2 t0. Hence, by de￿nition of the Bird rule,
X
i2A
Bi(N0;C) ￿ B￿(N
A￿
0 ;C
A￿) + m(A;CA):
Now we present a characterization of the Bird rule.
14Theorem 5.1 Over the domain D, a rule ￿ satis￿es NAM, CS, and IENP
if and only if ￿ = B:
Proof. Let t = f(i0;i)gi2N be an mt in the problem (N0;C). Let ￿ be a rule
satisfying NAM, CS and IENP.
We will prove that ￿i(N0;C) = ci0i for all i 2 N by induction on the
geodesic distance of agent i 2 N to the source in t. Let ￿(i) denote such a
geodesic distance.
For ￿(i) = 0 the result is trivial.
Assume ￿i(N0;C) = ci0i for all i 2 N such that ￿(i) < l.
Now, we will prove that the result is true for any i 2 N such that ￿(i) = l.
Let S = P(i;t)nf0g. Notice that m(S0 [ fig;CS0[fig) =
P
j2S cj0j + ci0i.
Under CS,
X
j2S
￿j(N0;C) + ￿i(N0;C) ￿ m(S0 [ fig;CS0[fig) =
X
j2S
cj0j + ci0i:
Under the induction hypothesis, ￿j(N0;C) = cj0j for all j 2 S: Hence,
￿i(N0;C) ￿ ci0i:
Now we prove that ci0i ￿ ￿i(N0;C).
Let Fi = F(i;t) and let ￿ = jIF(i;t)j. This means that there are ￿ agents
connected directly to agent i in the mt, maybe ￿ = 0.
Consider a new problem (N￿
0;C￿) similar to (N0;C); but adding an imper-
fect substitute for agent i. Formally, N￿
0 = N0 [ f￿g with ￿ > 0 su¢ ciently
small, c￿
jj0 = cjj0 for all j;j0 2 N0; c￿
i￿ = 0; c￿
j￿ = cji + ￿j; ￿j ￿ ￿ for all
j 2 IF(i;t), and c￿
j￿ large enough for all j 2 N0n(IF (i;t) [ fig). Under
these conditions, t￿ := t[f(i;i￿)g is an mt in (N￿
0;C￿), c(t￿) = c(t), and ￿ is
an ENP in (N￿
0;C￿).
Assume the agents in Fi[f￿g join to be treated as a single node ￿. That
is, consider the reduced problem2 (N￿A￿
0 ;C￿A￿) with A = Fi [ f￿g.
2We write N￿A￿
0 instead of (N￿)A￿
0 and C￿A￿ instead of (C￿)A￿:
15By de￿nition, c￿A￿
i￿ = min
j2A
fc￿
ijg, hence c￿A￿
i￿ ￿ c￿
i￿. Since c￿
i￿ = 0, we have
c￿A￿
i￿ = 0.
It is straightforward to check that t0 = f(j0;j)gj2NnFi [ f(i;￿)g is an mt
in (NA￿
0 ;CA￿).
Since ￿ satis￿es NAM,
X
j2A
￿j(N
￿
0;C
￿) ￿ ￿￿(N
￿A￿
0 ;C
￿A￿) + m(A;C
￿
A):
Under IENP, ￿￿(N￿A￿
0 ;C￿A￿) = 0. Hence,
X
j2A
￿j(N
￿
0;C
￿) ￿ m(A;C
￿
A): (1)
We study both terms.
Let K = NnFi: Note that i 2 K and K = N￿nA.
Claim I
P
j2A
￿j(N￿
0;C￿) = m(N0;C) ￿
P
j2Knfig
￿j(N￿
0;C￿) ￿ ￿i(N￿
0;C￿):
In the problem (N￿
0;C￿),
m(N
￿
0;C
￿) =
X
j2Knfig
￿j(N
￿
0;C
￿) + ￿i(N
￿
0;C
￿) +
X
j2A
￿j(N
￿
0;C
￿):
Clearly, m(N￿
0;C￿) = m(N0;C) and hence the result.
Claim II m(A;C￿
A) ￿ m(N0;C) ￿ m
￿
K0nfig;C￿
K0nfig
￿
￿ ci0i + ￿￿:
Let IFi = IF(i;t): By de￿nition of C￿, for an ￿ su¢ ciently small, we
can construct an mt ￿ on (A;C￿
A) such that the immediate followers of i
in t connect to ￿ and the rest of agents in A connect to the same nodes
as in t, i.e. ￿ = f(j0;j)gj2FinIFi [ f(￿;j)gj2IFi is an mt on (A;C￿
A).
Hence, m(A;C￿
A) =
P
j2FinIFi
c￿
j0j +
P
j2IFi
c￿
￿j.
By de￿nition, c￿
j0j = cj0j for all j 2 FinIFi and c￿
￿j ￿ cij + ￿ for all
j 2 IFi: Since ￿ = jIFij, we have
m(A;C
￿
A) ￿
X
j2Fi
cj0j + ￿￿: (2)
16Consider now (Fi [fig;CFi[fig). It is straightforward to check that we
can construct an mt t￿ on (Fi [fig;CFi[fig) such that each agent in Fi
connects to the same nodes as in t, i.e. t￿ = f(j0;j)gj2Fi is an mt on
(Fi [ fig;CFi[fig).
Hence, m(Fi [ fig;CFi[fig) =
P
j2Fi
cj0j:
Replacing this expression in (2), we have
m(A;C
￿
A) ￿ m(Fi [ fig;CFi[fig) + ￿￿:
On the other hand, since no agent in K connects to the source through
agent i in t, we have
m(N0;C) = m(K0nfig;CK0nfig) + ci0i + m(Fi [ fig;CFi[fig):
Combining the last two expressions:
m(A;C
￿
A) ￿ m(N0;C) ￿ m(K0nfig;CK0nfig) ￿ ci0i + ￿￿
= m(N0;C) ￿ m(K0nfig;C
￿
K0nfig) ￿ ci0i + ￿￿:
Applying Claim I and Claim II in (1) we deduce
m(K0nfig;C
￿
K0nfig) ￿
X
j2Knfig
￿j(N
￿
0;C
￿) + ci0i ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿i (N
￿
0;C
￿):
Since ￿ satis￿es CS,
ci0i ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿i (N
￿
0;C
￿):
Under IENP, ￿i (N￿
0;C￿) = ￿i (N0;C). Thus, ci0i ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿i (N0;C). But
￿i(N0;C) does not depend on ￿. Hence, ci0i ￿ ￿i(N0;C).
176 Independence of the axioms
In this section we show that the three axioms used in Theorem 5.1 are inde-
pendent.
The following rule assigns to each agent half of the cost of his adjacent
arcs in the mt. Moreover, the agents that connect directly to the source pay
the entire connection cost with the source. Formally,
￿
1
i(N0;C) :=
8
> <
> :
c0i + 1
2
P
j2IF(i;t)
cij if i0 = 0
1
2ci0i + 1
2
P
j2IF(i;t)
cij if i0 6= 0
for all C 2 D and i 2 N.
This rule satis￿es a stronger property than NAM, which states that if a
group of agents A join in advance in order to be treated as a single node, no
agent in NnA gets worse o⁄ in the reduced problem. Formally,
De￿nition 6.1 Let C 2 D and ￿ 2 A ￿ N: A rule ￿ satis￿es Strong No
Advantageous Merging (SNAM) if
￿i
￿
N
A￿
0 ;C
A￿￿
￿ ￿i (N0;C)
for all i 2 NnA.
It is not di¢ cult to check that SNAM implies NAM.
Even though this property is de￿ned for any A ￿ N, we can restrict
ourselves to the case jAj = 2. The reason is that any rule that satis￿es
SNAM for jAj = 2 will also satisfy SNAM for every jAj > 2.
Hence, it is useful to study the reduced problem when A = f￿;￿g: Given
an mt t in (N0;C), we can construct an mt in
￿
NA￿
0 ;CA￿￿
by simply deleting
the most expensive arc in the path that joins ￿ and ￿, as shown in Figure 1.
This result is formally stated in the next lemma:
Lemma 6.1 Let (N0;C) be an mcstp and let t be an mt in (N0;C). Given
A = f￿;￿g ￿ N, let ￿￿￿ be the path that connects ￿ and ￿ in t. Let
^ t: = tnf(k;l)g for some (k;l) 2 argmax(i;j)2￿￿￿ cij.
18Figure 1: Figure 1a) represents an mt in (N0;C): The most expensive arc in
the path that connects ￿ and ￿ is (k;l): In Figure 1b) nodes ￿ and ￿ join
and the most expensive arc is removed. The resulting tree is a mt in the
reduced problem.
The network
t
A￿ :=
￿
^ tnf(￿;i)g(￿;i)2^ t
￿
[ f(￿;i)g(￿;i)2^ t
is an mt on
￿
NA￿
0 ;CA￿￿
.
Proof. Consider the mcstp (N0;C0) de￿ned as c0
ij = cij for all fi;jg 6=
f￿;￿g and c0
￿￿ = ckl. It is straightforward to check that t is also an mt on
(N0;C0) (see for example the proof of Proposition 2.2iii in Aarts and Driessen
(1993)).
Since the cost of the arc (￿;￿) does not a⁄ect the de￿nition of
￿
NA￿;CA￿￿
,
both CA￿ and C0A￿ coincide. Hence, it is enough to prove that tA￿ is an mt
on
￿
NA￿;C0A￿￿
. We proceed by a contradiction argument. Assume there
exists a tree t￿ on
￿
NA￿;C0A￿￿
such that c
￿
t￿;C0A￿￿
< c
￿
tA￿;C0A￿￿
. The
counterpart of t￿ in (N0;C0) is de￿ned as follows. Let
O￿ :=
￿
(￿;i) 2 t
￿ : c
0A￿
￿i = c
0
￿i
￿
be the set of arcs in t￿ that would be adjacent to ￿ (the rest of the arcs
19(￿;i) 2 t￿ satisfy c0A￿
￿i = c0
￿i). We de￿ne the following tree in (N0;C0):
t
0 := (t
￿nO￿) [ f(￿;￿)g [ f(￿;i)g(￿;i)2O￿ :
To see that t0 is indeed a tree in (N0;C0), notice that it has exactly n arcs
(n￿1 arcs from t￿ plus (￿;￿)) and all of the nodes in N are connected to the
source: those that connect to the source through O￿ in t￿ will now connect
￿rst to ￿ and then to ￿ through (￿;￿).
We will prove that c(t0;C0) < c(t;C0), which is a contradiction because t
is an mt on (N0;C0). Notice that c0A￿
ij = c0
ij for all (i;j) 2 t￿nO￿. Thus,
c(t
￿nO￿;C
0) = c
￿
t
￿nO￿;C
0A￿￿
:
Hence,
c(t
0;C
0) = c(t
￿nO￿;C
0) + c
0
￿￿ +
X
(￿;i)2O￿
c
0
￿i
= c
￿
t
￿nO￿;C
0A￿￿
+ c
0
￿￿ +
X
(￿;i)2O￿
c
0A￿
￿i
= c
￿
t
￿;C
0A￿￿
+ c
0
￿￿ < c
￿
t
A￿;C
0A￿￿
+ c
0
￿￿ ￿ c(t;C
0)
where the last inequality comes from
c
￿
t
A￿;C
0A￿￿
= c
￿
^ tnf(￿;i)g(￿;i)2^ t ;C
0A￿
￿
+
X
(￿;i)2^ t
c
0A￿
￿i
￿ c
￿
^ tnf(￿;i)g(￿;i)2^ t ;C
0
￿
+
X
(￿;i)2^ t
c
0
￿i
= c
￿
^ t;C
0￿
= c(t;C
0) ￿ c
0
kl = c(t;C
0) ￿ c
0
￿￿:
Proposition 6.1 Over the domain D, ￿
1 satis￿es SNAM and IENP.
Proof. Let C 2 D and let t be an mt in (N0;C).
It is straightforward to check that ￿
1 satis￿es IENP.
We prove that ￿
1 satis￿es SNAM.
We can assume that jAj = 2. Let A = f￿;￿g ￿ N.
20Under Lemma 6.1, tA￿ is an mt in
￿
NA￿
0 ;CA￿￿
.
We prove that no agent i 2 NA￿nf￿g is worse o⁄ in the reduced problem
than in (N0;C).
Let (i;j) 2 tA￿; i 6= ￿;￿: We have two cases:
￿ If j = ￿; by de￿nition of tA￿; (i;￿) 2 t or (i;￿) 2 t: By de￿nition,
cA￿
i￿ = minfci￿;ci￿g. Hence, whatever agent i pays in the reduced prob-
lem for (i;￿) is not more than what he pays in (N0;C) for (i;￿) or
(i;￿):
￿ If j 6= ￿; by de￿nition of tA￿; (i;j) 2 t: Moreover, cA￿
ij = cij: Hence,
whatever agent i pays in the reduced problem for (i;j) is the same as
what he pays in (N0;C) for (i;j):
This rule violates CS. Consider the mcstp (N0;C) with N = f1;2g, c01 =
10, c02 = 15, and c12 = 6. The unique mt is t = f(0;1);(1;2)g. In this case,
￿
1
1(N0;C) = 13 > 10 = m(f0;1g;Cf0;1g).
Now we present a rule that satis￿es CS and SNAM (and hence NAM)
but does not satisfy IENP. First, we order the agents following their cost of
direct link to the source. Second, we assign to each agent the cost of the
most expensive arc from him to a source, taking into account that the agents
that precede him in the order are considered as sources. We de￿ne the rule
formally as follows:
Given an mt t on (N0;C) and i;j 2 N, let ￿ij denote the path that
connects i and j in t. Let ￿ 2 ￿N such that ￿(i) < ￿(j) ) c0i ￿ c0j. The
rule ￿
2 is de￿ned as follows:
￿
2
i(N0;C) := min
j2P￿
i [f0g
maxfckl : (k;l) 2 ￿ijg:
This rule appears in Bergantiæos and Vidal-Puga (2004a, after Corollary
4.1) with a di⁄erent formulation.
Consider the following example:
21Let (N0;C) such that N = f1;2;3;4g and
c01 = 0; c02 = 0; c03 = 20; c04 = 40
c12 = 8; c13 = 10; c14 = 5
c23 = 25; c24 = 30; c34 = 2:
The mt is t = f(0;1);(0;2);(1;4);(4;3)g.
In this case, there are two admissible orders: ￿1 = (1;2;3;4) and ￿2 =
(2;1;3;4): In both orders, ￿
2(N0;C) = (0;0;5;2):
We can also see that this rule is di⁄erent from the Bird rule.
As ￿
1 does, ￿
2 satis￿es SNAM and hence NAM. We prove this result in
the next proposition.
Proposition 6.2 Over the domain D, ￿
2 satis￿es SNAM and CS.
Proof. First we prove that ￿
2 satis￿es CS:
Bergantiæos and Vidal-Puga (2004a, after Corollary 4.1) prove that this
rule satis￿es Population Monotonicity (PM), and moreover PM implies CS.
We now prove in a intuitive way that ￿
2 satis￿es SNAM:
Let C 2 D and let t be an mt on (N0;C).
We can assume that jAj = 2: Let A = f￿;￿g ￿ N:
Under Lemma 6.1, tA￿ is a mt in (NA￿
0 ;CA￿).
We prove that every agent i 2 NnA is not worse o⁄ in the reduced problem
than in (N0;C).
Let ￿0 be the set of orders over NA￿; let ￿0 2 ￿0 such that ￿0(i) < ￿0(j) )
cA￿
0i ￿ cA￿
0j :
Note that by de￿nition, the order ￿0 coincides with the order ￿ in the
sense that the order is preserved in both problems. Formally,
￿ If i;j 62 A, then ￿(i) < ￿(j) i⁄ ￿0(i) < ￿0(j).
￿ For the agents in A, if the ￿rst agent in A is in position p in ￿; then
￿ will be in position p in ￿0:
Let i 2 NnA. We need to prove that ￿
2
i
￿
NA￿
0 ;CA￿￿
￿ ￿
2
i (N0;C).
22Let j 2 P ￿
i . It is enough to prove that the maximum cost of the path
between i and j in tA￿ (we take ￿ when j = ￿) is not more than the maximum
cost of the path between i and j in t: Let (k;l) be the most expensive arc in
the path from ￿ to ￿ in t: We distinguish two cases:
￿ If (k;l) does not belong to the path from i to j in t; the path from i to
j in tA￿ is the same. Hence, the maximum cost of the path from i to j
is the same in t as in tA￿:
￿ If (k;l) belongs to the path from i to j in t; the cost from i to j in tA￿
is not more because we have removed the most expensive arc of the path
from ￿ to ￿.
Since ￿
2 satis￿es NAM and CS, and it is di⁄erent from the Bird rule it
is clear that ￿
2 violates IENP.
Finally, we de￿ne a rule, ￿
3, that satis￿es CS and IENP but does not
satisfy NAM.
This rule is similar to the rule proposed by Dutta and Kar (2004). How-
ever, ￿
3 assigns zero cost to the ENP￿ s and the assignment of the rest of the
agents does not depend on the ENP￿ s.
Formally:
Let ￿ := fi 2 N : i is an Extreme Null Point in (N0;C)g
Consider the following algorithm:
Let S0 = f0g; t0 = ;; p0 = 0: Let S0
c = N0nS0:
Step 1: Choose an ordered pair (a0
1;a1) such that (a0
1;a1) 2 arg min
(i;j)2S0￿S0
c
j62￿
cij:
De￿ne p1 = max(p0;ca0
1a1); S1 = S0 [ fa1g; t1 = t0 [ f(a0
1;a1)g; S1
c =
N0nS1:
Step k: Assume we have de￿ned pk￿1; Sk; tk￿1 and Sk
c: Take an ordered
pair (a0
k;ak) 2 arg min
(i;j)2Sk￿1￿Sk￿1
c
j62￿
cij: Now, Sk = Sk￿1 [ fakg; tk = tk￿1 [
f(a0
k;ak)g; pk = max(pk￿1;ca0
kak) and Sk
c = N0nSk:
23Also,
￿
3
ak￿1(N0;C) = min(p
k￿1;ca0
kak): (3)
The algorithm ￿nishes at step m = jNjnj￿j: We de￿ne:
￿
3
am(N0;C) = t
m (4)
and
￿
3
i(N0;C) = 0 for all i 2 ￿: (5)
The rule ￿
3 is described by equations (3),(4) and (5).
In case that the set of ENP is empty, ￿
3 coincides with the rule proposed
by Dutta and Kar (2004).
To see that ￿
3 does not satisfy NAM we can consider Example 2.2. In
this example, the assignment proposed by ￿
3 coincides with the assignment
proposed by the rule presented by Dutta and Kar (2004) because there are
no ENP￿ s.
Proposition 6.3 Over the domain D, ￿
3 satis￿es CS and IENP.
Proof. It is clear that ￿
3 satis￿es IENP. On the other hand, the proof that
￿
3 satis￿es CS is similar to the proof that the rule proposed by Dutta and Kar
(2004) satis￿es CS (see Dutta and Kar (2004, Theorem 1)) and we omit it.
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